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Abstract 
This paper provides a model for audit market interventions. The study 
asks whether interventions in the audit market result in excessive premiums at 
the cost of quality and independence. The model was tested based on a historical 
data sample of 1,927 companies’ fiscal year financial statements, observed for 
the period 2010–2013. The testing strategy combined statistical analysis of the 
market concentration and regression of abnormal results. The findings do not 
support, for the Polish market, the conclusion that the audit market is used as  
a leverage for consulting services. This paper discusses possibilities of 
systematic risk for policymakers as a result of the negative interaction between 
regulated and non-regulated markets. 
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1. Introduction 
This study asks whether interventions in the audit market result in excessive 
premiums at the cost of quality and independence. 
Most previous academic studies in this area have concluded that audit fees and 
non-audit services (NAS) are inconsistent with real-life practices, because they largely 
limit their observation to isolated specific issues on the markets. In this paper, we offer 
a more general outlook on market forces and the interventions therein. 
The paper follows the pioneering work of Simunic (1980; 1984) on the 
audit market and provides a description of market interventions. The model was 
subsequently tested on the Polish market on the basis of 1,927 companies’ yearly 
financial statements for the period 2010–2013. Both descriptive and abnormal fee 
econometric modeling were applied to the Polish market. The evidence does not 
support the conclusion that interventions in the transitional market led to an 
excessive concentration of the audit market or to a tendency towards opinion 
shopping. 
These results add to the growing body of literature that has documented 
the association between audit and non-audit services, as well as to our systematic 
understanding of the determinants of audit fees. The results can be used as  
a guideline in the assessment of auditor quality and client motivation, and may 
help the appropriate regulatory body to control improper audit fee regulations in 
the audit service industry. 
2. Prior studies 
Agency theory 
Agency theory developed in response to the area of conflicts between 
agents and principals resulting from: 1) information asymmetry; 2) agent risk 
aversion; 3) setting up the imperium; 4) agent utility maximization at the cost of 
the principal; and 5) breakdowns of confidence between agent and principal 
(Gruszecki 2008, p. 90). The main goal of the principal is to maximize the value 
of the company while agents tend to maximize their remuneration and boost 
career development. To ensure the synergy of principals’ and agents’ goals, 
principals have to bear the agency costs (Fama 1980; Urbanek 1999; Goldin 
2013). A principal enters into an economic contract with an agent (Jeżak 2012) 
in order to run the business entity. If there is large discrepancy between the 
agent’s and the principal’s goals, or if high agency costs exist, the agent conflict 
is in place (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, p. 745). In depth reviews of this theory have 
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been presented by other researchers (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Zahra & Pearce 
1989; Eisenhardt 1989; Hatch 2002). We apply the agency theory as the framework 
for our audit fee discussion. 
Auditor fees 
In the 1930s, the Securities Act and Securities and Exchange Act banned 
auditors from serving on a client’s board of directors, due to potential conflicts 
of interest and lack of independence, both in fact and in appearance. The 
academic forum has mirrored this concern in numerous papers (for example: 
Hylton 1964; Schulte 1965; Carey & Doherty 1966; Schulte 1966). As Francis 
(2006, p. 749) pointed out, the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities noted 
that fully independent audits have become impossible since 1978, due to the fee 
dependence inherent in audit contracting. De Angelo (1981) observed that the 
auditor-client dependency is associated with the fee derived from a client, and 
this fee is associated with the complexity of the auditor’s operations. De 
Angelo’s observation was extended by Simunic (1984) to include non-audit fees 
(for Non-Audit Services (NAS)). Since an auditor can provide services other 
than auditing to his ‘audit client’, the discussion was enlarged to the non-audit 
fee aspect. Francis (2006) noted that consulting services were an integral part of 
non-audit services in the 1970s. Subsequent discussion was split into two 
dimensions: First when an auditor provides services to his current audit client  
(a risky position); and secondly when the service is provided to a non-audit 
client (a less risky position). The non-audit service can be arranged by the client 
to be conditioned on the outcome of the audit report (Ashbaugh LaFond & 
Mayhew 2003). In such cases, a manager might seek to influence the content of 
the audit report by awarding non-audit services to an existing auditor in 
exchange for a favorable audit report (Kornish & Levine 2004, p. 173). Frankel 
et al. (2002) linked poor earnings management (as a proxy for audit quality) with 
the provision of NAS, although other authors did not necessarily confirm this 
link (DeFond Raghunandan & Subramanyam 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Reynolds Deis & Francis 2004). A simple solution would be to ban an auditor 
from providing non-audit services to existing audit clients. However, such a ban 
would result in a reduction of the potential for knowledge-sharing between the 
auditing and non-audit services, and therefore lead to a reduction of economy of 
scale benefits to both the auditor and its clients – a model provided by Antle and 
Demski (1991) and empirically supported by Knechel et al. (2012). Additional 
revenues from the non-audit services enhance the ability of auditors to attract 
skilled staff, thus the quality of the audits themselves increase. Nevertheless, this 
may jeopardize the fairness of competition within the consulting market (for 
non-auditor market participants), as the inside information derived from the 
undertaking of audit services allows for a more precise pricing of consulting 
144                                                   Sylwia Morawska, Piotr Staszkiewicz                                         
 
services, thus explaining the auditors tendency towards consulting (Michalak & 
Waniak-Michalak 2009). For a historical review of this area the reader is 
referred to Watts and Zimmerman (1983) and other researchers (Francis 2006; 
Habib 2012; Hay Knechel & Wong 2006; Jong-Hang Choi 2008; Pott Mock & 
Watrin 2009; Schneider Arnold Church Bryan Ely 2006). This paper takes  
a general look at the audit market, aiming to provide a neo-liberal perspective of 
the potential development of the audit market. 
3. Model 
Suppose the audit market is unregulated in an equilibrium-perfect market; 
in such case the relation between demand and supply can be shown as follows: 
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with P (Price), Q (Quantity), D (Demand), S (Supply). The market at equilibrium 
point E is at the intersection of the quantity of the engagements qe with the price at pe.  
The cost to the economy (C) of providing the assurance on data is thus 
equivalent as follows: 
C= qepe. 
The value of C is outweighed by the possible loss to the economy arising 
from information containing misstatements, thus the potential loss (L) for the 
economy is (discrete model): 
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where Lkt is the loss to the economy due to the misleading information of 
company k at moment t, while r represents the rate of return on government 
bonds (risk-free rate to the specific economy). In consequence, L represents the 
classical present value of the future losses (if less any benefits derived, then net 
present value) to the economy. Lkt is a variable of unknown distribution and 
value. Future cash flow attributable to Lkt can be approximated based on the 
company’s historical lifetime tables (company mortality tables), with application 
of well-known actuarial techniques. Lkt(•). However it creates a multidimensional 
space, and we might reasonably assume that Lkt(•) is inversely related to the scope 
of the audit (existence or nonexistence of an external audit) – the number of 
companies undergoing audit in the economy (Assumption 1) and the level of audit 
quality and a vector, V, of other variables.  
The numbers of entities undergoing voluntary audit services is evidently 
less than the number of the corporations and business entities in the economy, 
thus:  
qe< qall, 
where qall represents all the business entities in the given economy. Consequently, 
in the economy we observe both audited and non-audited financial statements. 
Now let’s suppose the sovereign, with the aim of enhancing the credibility of 
reporting to a larger set of companies in the economy, is making an intervention to 
the market. 
Intervention A. The imposition of audit requirements for a given set of entities 
in the economy. As a consequence, ceteris parbius, the quantity changes from qe 
to qmin, within the equation 
qe< qmin<qall 
(unless the requirement is imposed on all the entities in the economy). As a result, 
there is a shift in demand. 
146                                                   Sylwia Morawska, Piotr Staszkiewicz                                         
 
 
 
     P                                                                       S 
                                                                Ea 
     pa  
                                                   E 
     pe                                                                          
D’ 
 
 
                                                                           D 
 
 
 
                                                    qe         qa                 
Q 
 
To satisfy the new required demand for quantity qa, the equilibrium price 
changes from pe to pa. Thus the product of the price and quantity increase, the 
additional cost to the economy, is (∆C): 
∆C = ∆p*∆q. 
At the same time, due to Assumption 1, there will be a mutual benefit to 
the economy, in that: 
∆L = L(qe) – L(qa). 
As a consequence, the increase in prices due to enlargement of the scope 
of obligatory audit is offset by the expected future benefit due to the enhanced 
quality of information, thus the border for Intervention A is the satisfaction of 
the following inequality: 
∆C ≤ ∆L. 
The market response to Intervention A can be complicated if the 
assumption of perfect competition and access to resources is abolished. In such  
a case, the market for an increase in audit capacity is limited, due to, for example, 
the training of staff and wage stickiness. In such a case, in order to satisfy the 
additional demand auditors provide the lower quality (less-detailed) audit services2 
so to save time on agreements and satisfy the incremental increase in demand. The 
                                                 
2
 The audit partner tends to increase the materiality level. 
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natural gatekeeper of this process is the failure-based responsibility of the auditor 
and audit companies for misconduct. However, imposing unlimited liability on the 
auditors for future possible losses on audited entities produces an adverse reaction. 
The biggest entities in the market have a substantial risk of high future potential 
damages, thus prices rise and auditors’ willingness to provide services falls, in 
extreme cases to such a level that the entity may be unable to find an auditor in the 
market that is ready to offer an audit service, thus falling into a trap of not 
satisfying the requirement for Intervention A.  
In order to maintain the quality of the services, the sovereign must provide 
regulations to measure the quality and uniformity of the services provided (e.g., by 
setting up the level of professional standards, and legal requirements for 
engagement). The policymaker do not have adequate skills and resources to monitor 
the complexity and performance of audit services, rather likely due to the low level 
of the quality assurance delegated to the self-regulatory professional body, while the 
policymakers and supervisors control the macroeconomic consequences of the 
regulation. Nevertheless, the need for quality requirements, a monitoring system, 
and a system of administrative sanctions gives rise to, as understood for the purpose 
of this model, Intervention B. 
Intervention B results in an increase in costs to the supply side of the 
market, and as a result, because of the inelasticity of the quantity, the adjustment 
is compensated for by an increase in prices. 
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The new equilibrium point Eb (qa, pb) represents the quantity demanded by 
Intervention A and the new price resulting from the restrictions imposed on 
quality. Thus the general cost of maintaining market quality in equilibrium is 
achieved if: 
Standardized costs of the audit quality times qa = (pb–pa)qa. 
Because of the shift in the supply function, the barrier to entry to the 
market increases (initial capital, quality, registration, peer review, professional 
qualification costs), thus the market shifts from being one of perfect competition 
towards a state oligopoly, where the premium of (pb–pa)qa must compensate for 
the additional burden to safeguard the quality system. 
The increase in price from pe to pb is a controversial political decision. 
The controversy is based both on the uncertainty of the L function and the 
auditors’ willingness to provide reasonably-priced services to the big companies 
in the market. This sets the scene for Intervention C. 
Intervention C. The policymaker or market might allow the auditors to 
limit their responsibility for companies’ further losses by imposing a cap on the 
amount of damage liabilities (e.g., by providing services with limited liabilities, 
setting up such a provision in auditing and accounting legislation, and/or 
limiting the number of parties empowered to recover losses from the auditors). 
The consequence of Intervention C is that the auditor seeks to find a balance 
between the quality obligation and the costs of auditing. On the one hand, the 
expected amount of future cash to be paid out arising from audit misconduct is 
limited, thus if the fee exceeds the imposed cap, the service might turn to its 
insurance without any value added to the auditee. On the other hand, a failure to 
perform an audit with due care will be subject to quality monitoring and 
potential penalties. The impact of Intervention C may thus be on the supply side 
of services, in such a way that might lower the price as a consequence of pc 
satisfying the following equation: 
qa(pb–pc) = LaudUnlim–LaudLim – E (costs of non-compliance), 
where E (costs of non-compliance) denotes the expected costs of the market’s 
non-compliance with the standards imposed by the policymaker. Because of this, 
the nature of the service is complicated and out of the direct control of the 
policymaker, as the system is run by a professional. Thus, the rules governing 
compliance and its control are delegated to the self-regulated body, thereby 
creating an inherent conflict of interest between the severity of the quality 
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maintenance program and the body members’ influence in reducing the burden.3 
A solution would be to ban active auditors from occupying a place in the 
controlling section of the self-regulatory body, which would lead to an expected 
drop in the price between pe and pb. The implementation of a cap on auditor 
liability results in moral hazard, especially for large companies, where the audit 
price might exceed the possible loss due to misconduct. Because the expected 
loss can be transferred to the insurance agent, and the maximum loss cannot 
exceed the predetermined amount of the cap, the service for those companies large 
enough becomes oriented to insurance rather than assurance, causing a negative 
distortion in the market participants’ favor. 
As a result of a combination of Interventions B and C, there is a shift in Supply 
from S to S’, resulting in an increase in entry barriers, S(0) < S’(0), creating entrance 
barriers for possible competitors. This limitation on competitors’ entry tends to lead to 
existing competitors deriving abnormal profits from their existing clients, thereby 
creating a tendency to concentrate their auditing portfolio. In response to this 
observation, the policy makers tend to impose requirements for limits on concentration 
over and above the auditors’ portfolio. This is Intervention D. 
Intervention D results, on the one hand, in a lowering of prices, which has 
different implications for small-portfolio highly-concentrated clients and the 
auditors tending to attract a more diversified portfolio of clients through  
a lowering of prices. On the other hand, a highly diversified portfolio of existing 
clients might accept the high prices of the big clients. The result is a decline in the 
audit fees on the low-tier market and an elimination of competitors from the high-
tier market (big company markets). As a result, the consequence of imposing 
portfolio concentration requirements does not necessarily have any specific net 
effect on demand and supply, but instead results in an adverse tendency towards  
a de-concentration of the small and medium market, along with limited 
competition on the high-price tier of the market, manifested in a difference in the 
actual hourly prices derived from small and large engagements.  
The current model, however, does not take into consideration the effect of 
the mutual provision of audit and non-audit services, while non-audit services 
constitute the non-regulated segment of the market. If the audit entity provides 
services to both the regulated and unregulated market, then its current clients have 
a competitive advantage over the rest of the non-regulated market competitors due 
to the following facts: 
                                                 
3
 Thus, there is a global tendency for the self-regulated body to be run by appointed professionals 
not active within the audit market, as opposed to a model where active market auditors charter 
professional organizations under a zero-remuneration scheme, which enhances the conflict of interest. 
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• Prior knowledge of the clients’ business originating from the provision of 
audit services; 
• Ability to utilize the effect of scale through the allocation of fixed costs to 
both audit and non-audit engagements; 
• Potential power of the auditor conditional on the output of the audit service 
(modified or non-modified audit report). 
The non-audit market (non-regulated market) might have one of two 
statuses in comparison to the audit market: 
Scenario A: The expected return on their services is lower than on the audit market; 
Scenario B: The expected return on their services is higher than on the audit market. 
Scenario A is more likely due to the motivation for setting up a regulated 
market, however due to the imposition of the quality burdens, monitoring, and 
control system, situation B could result.4 In the case of situation B, there is  
a greater likelihood of the auditor compromising on its technical and ethical 
standards if they take a share of the profits derived from the non-audit services. 
This, in turn, provides the grounds for Intervention E – a ban on the provision 
of non-audit services to existing clients. 
Intervention E leads to a short-term increase in audit fees on the markets. 
The above is tested, on Polish market, based on following set of hypothesis: 
H01: The concentration is significantly different for high-tier clients 
H02: The non-audit services derived from existing clients constitute more than 
20% of the total revenues. 
If H02 holds true, this indicates that the profitability of the non-audit 
services outperforms that of audit-related services, thus the auditor would be 
exposed to the temptation to safeguard the lucrative consulting services at the 
cost of its independence and audit quality. As a result, aggressive and atypical 
earnings management would be less likely to result in modification of the audit 
report. Thus, with H02 being conditional on highly leveraged engagements with  
a high level of non-audit revenues, the following hypothesis should be true: 
H03: The relationship between abnormal audit fees and total fees is not 
associated with opinion modification if more than 20% of revenue is derived 
from non-audit services. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Especially for the new markets, where the initial return is substantial, e.g., IT consulting during the 
1960s and 70s. 
                                                       Inherent Agency Conflict Built…                                           151 
 
4. Testing methodology 
For concentration estimation, the Herfindahl is used. It is defined as the 
sum of the squares (Herfindahl notation) (Hirschman 1964). Thus: 
                (1.0) 
where si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms.  
To obtain the abnormal audit fee, the fraction of the audit fee to total fee 
derived from the client was regressed with two basic price-making characteristics: 
the dynamic of the company and the company size. In order to capture this 
characteristic, the following analytical formula was applied: 
           (1.1) 
where: 
Af – audit fee charged by the auditor for the statutory audit 
Tf – total fee charged by the auditor 
IncTrend – represents the operating income trend in %. 
LN(assets) – represents a natural logarithm of total assets  
e – denotes the error term 
while i = 0….n, represents the index of the specific company financial statements. 
The residual from equation 1.1 represents the abnormal relation of the 
audit fee to the total audit fee.  
Consequently, the residuals of equation 1.1 were filtered with abnormal 
results, with residuals with values of mean plus twice the standard deviation being 
considered as abnormal. These selected residuals were subsequently regressed on 
the population of companies with a more than 20% ratio of non-fee revenues to 
audit revenues. The following analytical form of the model was applied: 
ABS( | = 
 
(1.2) 
where: 
|  – represents the i residual form equation 1.1. subject to the non-
audit to audit fee exceeding 20%; 
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Mod – is a binary variable of value 1 for modified audit opinions, and 0 for other 
cases. 
BIGN – is a binary variable of value 1 for international audit networks: Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, Mazars, BDO, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 0 for other cases. 
TierOne – is a binary variable of value 1 for companies with at least 50 employees 
and 0 for other cases. 
µ – error term. 
subscript i = 1,2,…k, where k represents the number of abnormal residuals from 
equation 1.1. 
In contrast to the priory abnormal accruals specification such as the cross-
sectional modified Jones model (Dechow Hutton Kim & Sloan, 2012; Dechow 
Sloan & Sweeney 1995; Jones, 1991) or Chung and Kallapur (Chung & Kallapur 
2003), this model is based on the abnormal rationing of the non-audit fee to the 
total audit fee, as the accrual management in period 2010–2013 carried 
memories of the subprime and PIG country credit crisis. For regression analysis 
the OLS methods were applied. Specific calculations were performed with the 
application of R, Statitisca and SPSS application (IBM 2015; StatSoft 2015; 
Team 2013). 
5. Dataset 
The dataset consists of the annual financial statements of Polish-registered 
companies for the years 2010–2013, sampled from the EMIS database, and these 
constitute the population. The initial dataset comprised 844 companies with 
3263 financial year statements. Due to the information gap with regard to 
publication and data access, not all records were assigned with appropriate audit 
opinions, thus the initial dataset was subsequently reduced to a feasible set.  
 
Total financial statements available in the sampled 
database for the period 2010–2013 (sampled April 
2014) 
 3263 
Records with non-assigned audit reports (missing data)  (1336) 
Final sample  1927 
 
Within the sample, records with data missing were skipped and not imputed 
in the model assessment. 
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6. Results 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in the table below: 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
    N  Max   Min  Mean      δ 
LogAssets 1927 -2.81 11.97 3.9377 2.50227 
LogRevenue 1892 -4.61 10.35 3.5536 2.61977 
Af/Tf 1459 .00 10.00 .8373 .33608 
Operating Income Trend (%) 1927 -1410.4 58413.0 591.729 3193.6558 
Tier One 1927 0 1 .55 .498 
Big N 1927 .00 1.00 .2558 .43644 
Modified opinion 1927 .00 1.00 .0882 .28369 
Source: own calculations. 
The dataset was inconsistent with the number of observations per variable, 
due to source data constraints, thus, specific estimations were limited on a case 
by case basis. 
Concentration 
A concentration analysis is presented in the table below. 
Table 2. Auditor concentration analysis for the Polish market 
     N         HHI 
High-tier clients   859 0.045282369 
All market 1927 0.02257615 
Source: own calculations. 
Although there are differences in the concentration index between both 
the high tier and entire market, the absolute concentration value indicates a low 
concentration in both segments. It should be noted however that if, for any given 
audit network, there is more than one audit entity, these are counted separately. 
The results indicate compliance with Morand and Joëlle Le Vourc’h’s (2011 
Table 136) prior report, wherein the authors indicated the share of the Big Four 
to the share of the top 20 mid‐tier firms at the level of 0.5, in contrast to Italy at 
–5.9 or Sweden at –4.0. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis that 
the concentration is significantly different for high-tier clients. 
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Share 
The share of the average audit fee to total fees is 0.8373, with a standard 
error of 0.00879, which indicates that approximately 17.6% of the total fee of 
auditors is derived from non-audit services, which allows for the rejection of the 
H02 hypothesis that the non-audit services derived from existing clients 
constitute more than 20% of total revenues.  
Abnormal fee 
Estimation of the abnormal audit fee to total fee. 
Table 3. Estimation of coefficientsa 
 
Coefficient St. coefficient 
t p-value B Std. Err. Beta 
 Intercept 
.982 .017  57.074 .000 
Operating Income Trend 
(%) -5.669E-6 .000 -.053 -1.864 .063 
LogAssets 
-.035 .004 -.254 -8.967 .000 
a. Dependent variable: Af/Tf 
Source: own calculations. 
Absolute unstandardized residuals were filtered, and cases with values of 
the twice the standard deviation were considered abnormal. Abnormal 
observations were subsequently regressed according to 1.2. The relationship 
between abnormal cases and opinion type were insignificant, thus the variables 
were dropped from the equation.  
Table 4. Cross table abnormal fee versus modified opinion  
 
Modified opinion 
Total .00 1.00 
Abnormal .00 Number 1306 135 1441 
% with mod. opinion 74.3% 79.4% 74.8% 
1.00 Number 451 35 486 
% with modified opinion 25.7% 20.6% 25.2% 
Total Number 1757 170 1927 
% with modified opinion 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: own calculations. 
The chi-square test suggests an insignificant relationship between the 
abnormal fee rate and opinion modification. Details of this are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Chi-square test 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
significance 
(both side) 
Precise 
significance 
(both side) 
Precise 
significance 
 (one side) 
Chi-squre Pearson 2.121a 1 .145   
Linear correctionb 1.861 1 .173   
Likelihood reaction 2.209 1 .137   
Fisher precise test    .165 .084 
Linear relation test 2.120 1 .145   
N  1927     
a. 0.0% cells with less than 5 theoretical observations. Minimal expected count 42.87. 
b. Calculated for table 2x2 
Source: own calculation. 
The regression results of the remaining variables are shown below: 
Table 6. Model – summary,c 
 
R 
R-square Adj. R-square SEE 
Abnormal = 1.00 
 (Selected) 
Abnormal ~= 1.00  
(Not selected) 
 .515a .276 .265 .107 1.91826 
a. Predictors: (Intercept), Tier One, Big N, LogRevenue 
b. Based on observation where Abnormal = 1,00. 
c. Dependent variable: absolute value of residuals 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table 7. Coefficientsa,b 
 
Non-standardized coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
t p-value B SE Beta 
 (Intercept) -1.130 1.275  -.886 .391 
Big N -.453 1.383 -.112 -.327 .748 
LogRevenue .483 .286 .584 1.689 .113 
Tier One 1.117 1.110 .235 1.007 .331 
a. Dependent variable: Absolute value of residuals 
b. Only for observation, where Abnormal = 1.00 
Source: own calculations. 
As a result, all control variables were insignificant to explain the abnormal 
audit fee relationship, thus no evidence was found to reject the H03 hypothesis. 
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Discussion of results 
Rejection of the hypothesis H01 (concentration) and rejection of H03 (no 
quality issue) goes against the model developed and ties in with the reported 
results shown by Morand and Joëlle Le Vourc’h (2011). On the other hand, the 
methods applied are sensitive to the final testing count, and as a result the 
number of 35 modified opinions linked with abnormal rate results is not 
necessarily strong enough to support persuasive conclusions. The total testing 
sample of 1,927 yearly observations is representative of the Polish market, thus 
the processes indicated in the model are not yet finalized on the Polish market. 
The design of the testing experiment should probably be modified, which opens 
up a future discussion on an alternative study experiment design. 
The most visible result of the testing sample is that the H02 – non-audit 
services derived from existing clients constitute less than 20% (ca 17%) of the 
total revenues. This result does not support the observation on the application of 
the regulated market as a leverage for consulting services, which in turn 
indicates a disturbance in free market competition in the consulting market due 
to information asymmetry. This observation is not in line with the conclusions 
regarding the US market of Francis (Francis 2006). However the existing 
fraction is relatively close to the thumb limit. This finding does not support the 
overall policy-setter tendency to limit the degree of leverage between audit and 
non-audit services. As a result, overregulation of the audit markets tends to 
impede the quality of audit services at the cost of competition asymmetry in the 
non-regulated consulting segment to the market. 
The above finding is limited to the size and time span of the dataset and to 
indirect verification of the experiment design. In general, historical data are 
regarded as unreliable because they are limited to historical market processes, 
which are not necessarily replicable in future periods. Secondly, the findings are 
based on a four-year data set and a small (especially for H03) sample. Because of 
this, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
7. Conclusions 
This study examined whether intervention in the audit market results in 
excessive premiums at the cost of quality and independence. This issue is linked to the 
current worldwide trend among policymakers to safeguard auditor independence. 
The paper presents scenarios of consequences for different degrees of 
disturbance to the free market in the setting of audit services. The model was 
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verified with historical data from the Polish auditing market. The findings do not 
support the conclusion that the audit market is used as leverage for consulting 
services. Incoherence in the audit market is generated as a result of disturbances 
to free market competition within the consulting market due to information 
asymmetry on the side of the auditors. 
This paper does not support the policy-setters’ tendency to limit non-audit 
services to a fraction of the overall audit fee. 
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Streszczenie 
 
NIEODŁĄCZNY KONFLIKT AGENTA WBUDOWANY W MODEL 
WYNAGRODZENIA BIEGŁEGO REWIDENTA 
 
Artykuł przedstawia model interwencji na rynku rewizji finansowej. Obszarem 
badania jest analiza czy interwencja na rynku rewizji finansowej powoduje zwiększenie 
premii rewidenta kosztem jakości i niezależności badania. Model został przetestowany 
na danych historycznych obejmujących 1927 rocznych sprawozdań finansowych za lata 
2010–2013. Strategia weryfikacji obejmowała zastosowanie wskaźników koncentracji 
oraz regresję nietypowego składnika losowego. Zebrane wyniki wskazują, iż rynek 
rewizji finansowej nie jest stosowany, w Polsce, jako dźwignia do rynku usług 
konsultacyjnych. Restrykcje nałożone na rynek rewizji nie wpływają na konkurencję na 
rynku usług konsultacyjnych. Badanie nie wskazuje obecnie w Polsce na ryzyko 
systemowe negatywnego sprzężenia pomiędzy regulowanymi i nieregulowanymi rynkami. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: agent, audytor, konflikt, poza-rewizyjne składniki wynagrodzenia, jakość 
badania, model, zarządzanie wynikiem 
